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1. Introduction 
When starting a new business, entrepreneurs can utilize several financing sources. Besides own 
capital and bank loans, formal and informal investors can provide venture capital to the entre-
preneur (Berger and Udell, 1990). Informal investors play a significant role in the financing of 
new entrepreneurial ventures. Bygrave et al. (2003) state that informal venture capital is the 
primary source of external equity finance for new businesses. Several studies highlight the role 
of informal investors and describe extensively the characteristics, involvement and behavior of 
informal investors (cf. Landström, 1998; Hindle and Wenban, 1999). Still, there is little empiri-
cal research explaining the factors that determine the propensity of individuals to make informal 
investments  in  businesses  owned  by  others (Maula  et al., 2005;  Szerb et  al.,  2007). This is 
mainly caused by limited availability of data on informal venture capital. In this paper we inves-
tigate the determinants of the propensity of individuals to make informal investments using the 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) micro dataset for the participating countries in GEM 
2002-2004. We will make a comparison between the profiles of informal investors and non-
investors, and will seek to derive policy implications for the participating countries.  
 
As the number of informal investors is relatively low in several developed countries like the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom, we are interested in the factors that determine informal 
investments. We draw on management, finance and economics research theory in order to out-
line a comprehensive list of hypotheses relating to the interaction between entrepreneurial activ-
ity and the supply of informal investors.  Individuals making an informal investment are called 
either ‘business angels’ or one of the 3 FFFs - friends, fools and family -, by which we mean 
that they personally provide funds for a new business started by someone else, excluding any 
purchases of stocks or mutual funds (Kelly, 2007).  We then outline an empirical methodlody 
and test the hypotheses.  We specify and estimate equations, at the individual (micro) level, ex-
plaining the prevalence of informal investors. A novelty of the research is that it is one of the 
first studies that analyses the factors that drive informal investment.  Furthermore, the empirical 
testing has a strong advantage of empirical rigour compared to the descriptive studies which 
have dominated this data scarce field. 
 
We use the individual level data from the Adult Population Survey for all countries participat-
ing in GEM in the years 2002 to 2004 to estimate the equation. The countries can be divided in 
two groups according to the nature of the markets in those countries, i.e. high versus low entre-
preneurially active markets. We make use of this distinction in part of our analysis.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we start with a literature review and present our hy-
potheses. In section 3 we discuss the data. This section also contains an extensive subsection 
presenting  descriptive  statistics  on  business  angel  prevalence,  making  a  distinction  between 
highly and lowly developed countries. Section 4 outlines the research approach and discusses 
the methods that will be used in the analysis. Subsequently, we report the results of the regres-
sion analyses. These regressions focus on highly developed countries only. The paper concludes 
with a discussion covering the main findings, policy implications and recommendations for fur-
ther research. 
 
2. Theory and hypotheses 
We now outline a number of schools of thought with the potential to influence the relationship 
between an individual’s involvement with entrepreneurship and informal investment activity.  
The  entrepreneurial  finance  literature  distinguishes  between  two  types  of  informal  investors 
known as the 3 FFFs and (pure) business angels (Bygrave et al., 2003, and Sohl, 1999, 2003).  
The 3 FFFs denoting Friends, Fools and Family refer to individuals who engage in informal in-
vestment who have a close personal relationship with the entrepreneur/s.  This relationship is   5
probably one of the reasons why they have made the investment.  Either they may trust the en-
trepreneur/s and/or simply want to help them.  These non-pecuniary influences do not preclude 
a simultaneous financial motivation.  By contrast, the second group of informal investors, busi-
ness angels, are those investing more purely for financial reasons and hence one would expect 
this type of investment to be  carried out in a  more  professional and indeed  formal  manner.  
Later when we discuss the data we will be able to distinguish between people who are 3 FFF in-
vestors from those who invest in businesses run by strangers (i.e. pure business angels). Venture 
capitalists (VCs) distinguish themselves from informal investors usually on the basis that they 
invest larger sums, focus more on later stage investment and as a formal financial services com-
pany are more heavily regulated. 
 
The main motivation for our research is to investigate the relationship between entrepreneurial 
activity and the supply of informal investors.  To date most research takes a very static view 
where entrepreneurial activity causes an increase in demand and hence shortage in the supply of 
venture capital.  We intend to investigate the possibility that there may be some endogeneity 
where entrepreneurial activity promotes the supply of informal investors.  This relationship has 
major implications for medium-longer term entrepreneurial performance.   
 
We think there are four broad schools of research that have a bearing on the probability of a 
person with some involvement in entrepreneurship becoming an informal investor.  The first of 
these is taken from classical economics’ limited resource allocation theory dating back to the 
work of Smith (1776) and Marshall (1890).  In this framework individuals have limited endow-
ments  of  time  (labor)  and  money  (capital).    They  optimise  the  use  of  these  in  their  career. 
Therefore, more time or money spent in one activity leaves less of these resources available for 
other activities.  Like venture capitalists, informal investors have limited amounts of finance 
and have to allocate their time between finding, then screening, then enticing, then negotiating 
and  then  contracting  with  business  ventures  (investment  opportunities)  as  well  as  managing 
these investments and also engineering harvest/exits (see Riding et al., 2007, for an overview).  
Campbell (2003) argues that one of the distinguishing features dividing business angels from 
venture capitalists is that the former frequently do not have enough funds to finance a venture 
through to exit.  By consequence given that the time and finance requirements for running a 
business are considerable, this school of thought would predict either an insignificant or nega-
tive relationship between entrepreneurial activities and the probability of becoming an informal 
investor.   Therefore, if this resource constraint binds then there will be a negative relationship 
between entrepreneurial activity and the probability of being a 3 FFF or business angel.  If on 
the other hand involvement in entrepreneurship rarely exhausts finance and time resources to 
the point that they impinge upon the capability of becoming an informal investor then a zero or 
insignificant relationship should result.  This gives us Hypothesis 1. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The classical economics limited resources model implies either a negative 
or insignificant relationship between entrepreneurial activity and the probability of be-
coming an informal investor for time and/or finance resource constrained and uncon-
strained individuals respectively.  
 
The next school of thought is compiled from a number of different areas of research.  A central 
theme is the belief that far from causing a trade-off with the probability of becoming an infor-
mal investor, entrepreneurial activity actually promotes it.  Given its conflict with classical eco-
nomics it is perhaps not too surprising to find that the central argument of Keynesian economics 
that demand will generate its own supply plays a role (Keynes, 1936).  The basic application of 
Keynesian logic to the case at hand is that greater entrepreneurial activity creates a demand for 
informal finance which manifests itself in the creation of new entrepreneurial investment oppor-  6
tunities for FFFs/business angels.  The availability of increased opportunities encourages an in-
crease in the number of informal investors who are keen to exploit them.  This is nothing other 
than a perfectly elastic Keynesian supply schedule – of course, this time the supply of informal 
investors. But it is important to point out that the Keynesian argument is about an aggregate ef-
fect and not an intra individual circularity of causation between entrepreneurial and informal 
investment activity.  Therefore, in the current context Keynes’ logic is not necessarily in con-
flict with the classical hypothesis 1 which concerns an individual but by contrast would imply 
that at the aggregate level countries with greater levels of entrepreneurial activity will increase 
the probability of any individual becoming an informal investor.  We test this proposition by in-
cluding the aggregate level of entrepreneurial activity as an independent variable in equations to 
predict the likelihood that an individual will become a business angel and/or FFF informal in-
vestor.   
 
Hypothesis 2a: An individual in a country with higher levels of entrepreneurial activity 
is more likely to become a business angel than an individual in a country with a lower 
level of entrepreneurial activity. 
 
We must also consider the fact that informal entrepreneurial investment typically occurs at an 
earlier stage than venture capital investment.  VC activity can provide follow on funding as well 
as exits for informal investors thereby forming a complementary positive relationship between 
the two activities.  However a young or underdeveloped venture capital industry (without a long 
track record to enable large scale fund raising) typically involves smaller VC fund size forcing 
more smaller scale and hence early stage investments. Likewise, a less entrepreneurially active 
economy may not provide the scale of investment opportunities required for larger scale (later 
stage) VC fund raising and an adequate portfolio size for disbursements.  Therefore, in less ac-
tive  entrepreneurial  markets  informal  investors  and  venture  capitalists  may  find  themselves 
more frequently in competition with one another for early stage investments i.e. they are more 
often substitutes rather than complements.  This gives rise to hypothesis 2b.    
 
Hypothesis 2b: The higher the level of entrepreneurial activity in a country, the greater 
the likelihood and scale of a positive relation between the level of VC investment per 
capita and the probability of any individual of becoming an informal investor. 
 
The strongest theoretical challenges to the classical hypothesis 1 in fact does not come from the 
Keynesian school but from other quarters.  One source is human resource management theory 
and closely associated labor economics (e.g. Evans and Jovanovic, 1989 and Blanchflower and 
Oswald, 1998).  These relate an individual’s profile in terms of ability and motivation and how 
well this fits with any particular career.  In essence, we note that many of these profile charac-
teristics  are  similar  between  informal  investors  and  entrepreneurs.  Both  would  have 
skills/ability relevant for business venturing, some wealth/finance for investment, have a pro-
pensity to take risks, a tolerance of ambiguity and enjoyment of the buzz/excitement associated 
with new ventures (Knight, 1921, Burke et al., 2000, Campbell, 2003, Kelly, 2007, and Riding 
et al., 2007). Therefore, if a person chooses to spend some of their career in entrepreneurship 
this school of thought would argue that, all other things being equal, they would have an above 
average probability of becoming a business angel or 3 FFF investor.   
 
Hypothesis 3: The HRM-Labor economics schools of thought imply a positive relation-
ship between an individual’s entrepreneurial activity and the probability of becoming an 
informal investor. 
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The fourth and final school of thought draws on a diverse research literature and we label this 
group the entrepreneurial capital accumulation school of thought.  In essence, a wide array of 
research appears to indicate that far from depleting resources necessary to become a business 
angel, entrepreneurship is more likely to enhance these resources thereby raising the probability 
that these people will choose to become an informal investor. Birley (1985) highlights the im-
portance of networks in the entrepreneurial and business angel community.  Therefore, being 
entrepreneurially active builds social capital useful for business angel activity.  Bhide (2000) 
and Birley (2002) both point out how being an entrepreneur helps to build credibility and a 
reputation.  Gompers and Lerner (1999) highlight the importance of reputation as a means of  
enabling venture capitalists to raise funds.  While most informal investors use their own funds, 
Harrison and Mason (1996, 2000) point out the importance of business angels operating in net-
works and co-investing with other business angels.  In such an environment a reputation for 
having  entrepreneurial  expertise  increases  the  ability  of  an  informal  investor  securing  co-
investors; especially important if an entrepreneur has limited financial resources and wants to 
overpower the constraints of hypothesis 1.  Being entrepreneurially active indicates hands on 
experience which can be crucial in order to signal to others that the individual has some exper-
tise drawn from experience.  Learning by doing/discovering (Nelson and Winter, 1982, Jovano-
vic, 1982, Minniti and Bygrave, 2001), knowledge spillovers (Audretsch and Feldman, 2004) 
and endogenous growth theory (Romer, 1994) also play a role here too.  In essence being entre-
preneurially active can be a ‘learning academy’ through which many of the skills learnt are 
relevant for successful informal investment activity.   
 
However, it is not all about social and human capital accumulation.  Involvement in entrepre-
neurship can be a very rewarding activity and result in wealth (financial capital) accumulation.  
This in turn can increase the propensity for an individual to take risks (Burke and Hanley, 2003 
and 2006) and so raise the probability that they will become an informal investor.  Likewise, 
since early stage investment finance is usually too risky for bank finance there is a constraint on 
business angels financing investment through leveraged finance.  Therefore, wealth accumula-
tion through entrepreneurial activity may reduce finance constraints and enable latent business 
angels to become active.  There is a wide bank of evidence to show that these effects apply to 
entrepreneurs investing in their own business spurred on by lottery windfalls (Taylor, 2001), in-
heritance (Blanchflower and Oswald 1998, Burke et al 2000) and so it would be reasonable to 
expect that they may play a role in encouraging individuals to invest in the ventures of family, 
friends and strangers.  We combine the impact of all these various theories of social, human and 
financial capital accumulation acquired through being entrepreneurially active on the probabil-
ity of becoming an informal investor as follows:   
 
Hypothesis 4: The entrepreneurial capital accumulation school of thought indicates that 
entrepreneurial activity will increase an individual’s endowment of resources necessary 
for informal venture finance and hence increases the probability of an individual be-
coming a business angel or 3 FFF. 
 
We test these hypotheses using a range of different measures at the level of the individual using 
independent variables relating to past, present and future (planned) entrepreneurial activity. We 
also test for the impact of being involved in intrapreneurship.  The robustness of our results is 
tested by dividing the sample into countries with low and high levels of entrepreneurial activity 
in order to assess if our results are unique to or consistent with both types of market. This also 
enables us to test hypothesis 2b, i.e. we ascertain whether business angel and VC investment 
work as complementary sources of finance or as competitors in high and low entrepreneurially 
active markets. We also differentiate between informal investment of the 3 FFFs category ver-
sus more purely defined business angel investment in ventures owned by strangers.   8
 
 
3. Data description 
3.1. GEM Adult Population Survey 
In order to investigate the determinants of informal investments, we use individual level data 
from the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). The GEM survey contains various measures 
that give insight into the degree of entrepreneurial activity, as well as attitudes and perceptions 
towards entrepreneurship. These data are collected by a standardized telephone survey based on 
approximately 2000 adult respondents per country, making the GEM survey representative for 
the population. As the GEM survey is conducted in the same way each year, we pool three years 
of data, namely 2002, 2003 and 2004. Not all countries in the data set participated in the GEM sur-
vey for each of these years. Hence we will use an unbalanced panel data set (in terms of coun-
tries) for our analyses. In total we use data for 45 different countries (listed in Table 1 in Sec-
tion 3.5), corresponding to 364,843 observations. Among these observations are 8,554 informal 
investors (2.4%). In our analyses we will distinguish between higher and lower developed coun-
tries. As will be described later, for our descriptive statistics analysis we will use data for all 
countries,  while  our  more  formal  regression  analysis  will  use  data  for  28  higher  developed 
countries only (this is related to data availability).  
 
3.2 Dependent variable 
In this paper we estimate an equation, at the individual (micro) level, explaining the prevalence 
of informal investment. The main dependent variable we use in our analyses is whether a re-
spondent is an informal investor or not. The following question is asked in the GEM survey: 
“You have, in the past three years, personally provided funds for a new business started by 
someone else, excluding any purchases of stocks or mutual funds” (yes/no). In addition, there is 
a question about the relationship with the person that received this personal investment. The 
possible  answers are ‘close family  member’, ‘some  other relative,  kin or  blood relation’, ‘a 
work colleague’, ‘a friend or neighbour’ or ‘a stranger with a good business idea’.
1 We aggre-
gate the first-mentioned four categories into one category labelled friends and family (diplo-
matically leaving out the term fools), so that we distinguish three main categories of individu-
als: not an informal investor, informal investor in a firm of a friend or family member, and 
business angel investing in a firm of a stranger. We will estimate a multinomial logit model 
where the prevalence of these three categories is explained. 
 
3.3 Independent variables 
The first group of explanatory variables are related to entrepreneurial activity at the individual 
level (past, present and future) and hence have a bearing on hypotheses 1, 3 and 4.   The  GEM 
survey asks the respondent whether he or she is currently an owner/manager of a business.  The 
limited resources classical school would view this activity as having a trade-off with informal 
investment  activity.    Running  a  business  consumes  personal  resources  thereby  reducing  the 
amount of remaining time (labor) and money (capital) available for business angel and 3 FFF 
informal investment activity.  By contrast, both the HRM-labor economics and capital accumu-
lations schools of thought would view a positive relationship – entrepreneurs having similar 
characteristics in the case of the former and entrepreneurs gaining key capabilities for informal 
 
1 We only label those individuals who respond to the (second) question of the relationship to the investee, as business angel. 
Hence, respondents indicating to be a business angel based on the first question (“have you provided funds”) but who did not re-
spond to the second question are labeled “no business angel”. Vice versa, those who answered no on the first question, but did 
indicate a type of relationship with an investee, is counted as a business angel. This way we correct the responses of individuals 
who misunderstood the first question.   9
investment in the case of the latter.  Relating this to our hypotheses in section two gives the fol-
lowing predictions: 
 
Hypothesis 1 supported if: People who currently run a business are less likely to engage in in-
formal investment activity. 
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 supported if: People who currently run a business are more likely to engage 
in informal investment activity. 
 
In the GEM survey, the respondent is also asked whether he or she is currently trying to start up 
a new independent business. The classical school would argue that this process is probably both 
already diverting resources away from informal investment or causing an individual to reserve 
finance and time for the forthcoming venture.  The HRM- labour economics school would argue 
that by virtue of the individual choosing to get involved in a new venture he/she also has a pro-
file suitable to become a business angel.  The entrepreneurial capital accumulation schools of 
thought might concede that financial capital is unlikely to be enhanced at this stage but that so-
cial  and  human  capital  could  well  be  enhanced  by  both  early  steep  learning  and  credibility 
building curves.  Therefore, applying hypotheses 1, 3 and 4 to this variable we might expect:  
 
Hypothesis 1 supported if: People who are currently trying to start up a new business are less 
likely to engage in informal investment activity. 
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 supported if: People who are currently trying to start up a new business are 
more likely to engage in informal investment activity. 
 
The GEM survey asks the respondent  whether he or she expects to start-up  a  new  business 
within the next three years. This aspiration could have a number of effects. First, in line with 
the classical school this may divert finance from informal investment to the new venture hence 
reducing the ability to become an informal investor.  Second, it is plausible that a person plan-
ning to start a business might expect to become wealthier soon and if so, this might have a posi-
tive effect on the probability of engaging in informal investment activity.  The latter effect may 
be particularly relevant for overly optimistic individuals who are prevalent among entrepreneurs 
and  those  willing  to  take  risk  of  investing  in  entrepreneurial  ventures  (de  Meza  and  Webb, 
1987, de Meza and Southey 1996).  Therefore, in line with HRM-labor economics reasoning the 
profile of a person expecting to start a new business in the future might be closely associated 
with one with a desire to also become an informal investor.  Depending on the level of prepara-
tion  one  is  making  for  the  future  start-up  (for  example,  saving  money  or  learning  business 
skills) one might expect the entrepreneurial capital accumulation school of thought to predict an 
associated rise in the probability of an individual choosing to become an informal investor.   
 
Hypothesis 1 supported if: People who expect to start up a new business within the next three 
years are less likely to engage in informal investment activity.  
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 supported if: People who expect to start up a new business within the next 
three years are more likely to engage in informal investment activity.  
 
Intrapreneurship or corporate venturing is another explanatory variable that we use in our analy-
sis.  The GEM survey asks the respondent whether his or her current job involves starting up a 
new business.   Application of the classical school’s hypothesis 1 gives an uncertain outcome in 
this case.  Intrapreneurship certainly limits the time an individual can engage in business angel 
activity.  However, employment earnings especially for those involved in corporate venturing   10
can be lucrative thereby enhancing the amount of finance an individual can devote to informal 
entrepreneurial investment.  Kelly (2007) and Campbell (2003) note that successful business 
executives account for a significant proportion of business angels.  Likewise, the HRM-Labor 
economics school also gives an unclear predication here.  While there are many common activi-
ties between intrapreneurship and entrepreneurship one major dividing line is the propensity for 
risk taking.  Therefore, these countervailing influences mean that the HRM-labour economics 
school have an ambiguous prediction in relation to the impact of intrapreneurship on the prob-
ability of an individual choosing to become an informal investor.  By contrast the entrepreneu-
rial capital accumulation school of thought gives a prediction of a positive effect.  Corporate 
venturing engages executives with entrepreneurs as well as business angel and venture capital 
networks thereby raising social capital.  In addition, there are many overlaps of skills in launch-
ing a corporate venture and an independent start-up so that we would expect this to enhance 
human capital relevant for business angel activity.  Thirdly, as we noted intrapreneurship can be 
lucrative thereby enhancing financial capital for business angel activity.  Combined these imply 
hypothesis 4 has a bearing on the use of this particular GEM question as an independent vari-
able.   
 
Hypothesis 4 supported if: People who start a new business on behalf of their employer are 
more likely to engage in informal investment activity.  
 
The GEM survey also asks the respondent whether he or she has shut down a business in the 
past twelve months.  This is also relevant for the various schools of thought.  The classical 
school is again agnostic. If closure of a business is associated with financial losses then it may 
reduce finance available for 3 FFF and business angel investment.  However, closure might 
monetise positive net assets for the owner as well as freeing up his/her time thereby increasing 
the probability of becoming an informal investor.  There is some evidence in the labor econom-
ics literature indicating that the harsh reality of the business world may make an individual less 
optimistic (Burke, 1997, Fraser and Greene, 2006).  In this case a negative relationship could 
result from business closure and business angel activity.  By contrast, the entrepreneurial capital 
accumulation school would predict a positive influence, namely learning from mistakes or bad 
experiences increases ability and hence the likelihood of being a more successful informal in-
vestor. 
 
Hypothesis 3 supported if:  People who have recently shut down their own business are less 
likely to engage in informal investment activity. 
 
Hypothesis 4 supported if:  People who have recently shut down their own business are more 
likely to engage in informal investment activity. 
 
The final micro-level variable that is included in the analyses in fact tests an almost axiomatic 
assumption of the business angel research literature and indeed our own analysis.  It relates to 
entrepreneurial skills. One GEM survey question asks each respondent whether he or she has 
the knowledge, skills and experience to start up a new business. We would imagine that a per-
son who believes that they have entrepreneurial skills is more likely to invest informally, be-
cause many business angels actively take part in the firm that they invest in.   All three schools 
of thought would predict a positive relationship between entrepreneurial skills and the probabil-
ity of an individual becoming a business angel. 
 
Hypotheses 1, 3 and 4 supported if: People with entrepreneurial skills are more likely to engage 
in informal investment activity.  
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Concerning our hypotheses at the macro-level (hypotheses 2a and 2b) we use two variables. 
First, we use GEM’s well-known TEA index, defined as the percentage of adult population that 
is either actively involved in starting a new venture or is the owner/manager of a business that is 
less than 42 months old. Data on total entrepreneurial activity are taken from the GEM Adult 
Population  Surveys  for  the  years  2002-2004.  In  particular  we  focus  on  those  entrepreneurs 
whose primary motive to become an entrepreneur was that they saw an entrepreneurial opportu-
nity to be exploited (TEA opportunity rate). To test hypothesis 2b, we use a country’s (formal) 
Venture Capital Investment (VCI) per capita, measured by classic venture capital invested do-
mestically in thousands of US$ (and divided by population). This variable is not only an indica-
tor of the development of the venture capital industry, but also for the availability of exit oppor-
tunities for early stage informal investors. VCI per capita is expected to have a positive effect in 
the models. We take data from the National Venture Capital Association Yearbook for the years 
2002-2004, obtained through secondary data bases collected by the GEM research consortium.
2 
Hypotheses 2a and 2b are related to these two variables as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2a supported if: People from countries with a higher TEA opportunity rate are more 
likely to engage in informal investment activity. 
 
Hypothesis 2b supported if: The (positive) relation between VCI per capita and the probability 
of becoming a business angel is stronger for countries with a higher TEA opportunity rate than 
for countries with a lower TEA opportunity rate.  
 
It is worth noting that support for hypothesis 2b requires both empirical validation of a positive 
relationship between VCI per capita and the probability of becoming an informal investor as 
well as observance that the coefficient on this relationship is higher for more entrepreneurially 
active markets.   
 
3.4 Control variables 
Besides the aforementioned independent variables, we want to control for several demographic 
and structural characteristics of the individuals, like gender (1=male, 2=female), age (in six 
categories), and the level of education (in three categories).
3 The GEM micro dataset contains 
demographic variables of the surveyed adult population of each participating country. 
 
Next to these control variables at the micro level, we also want to include control variables at 
the macro/country level. First, we want to include a country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
per capita, measured in current international dollars in purchasing power parities. It is expected 
that, on average, people have more money to invest in countries with a higher per capita in-
come. We use data of the International Monetary Fund for the period 2002-2004. A second con-
trol variable at the macro-level is the national rate of GDP growth, accounting for the business 
cycle effect. We use World Bank data for the period 2002-2004. The third macro-level control 
variable is a country’s interest rate, indicating the cost of capital. Since returns on alternative 
investments (i.e. regular loans) may be higher, this variable is expected to have a negative effect 
on the prevalence of being an informal investor. However, there is also a counter effect. When 
 
2 More specifically, data for the variable Venture Capital Investment are taken from data sets provided in the “GEM Members 
Area”. For the year 2004 we have taken the variable labeled "Classic VC invested domestically $US (1,000)" from the financing 
data set of 2004. The same variable is used for 2002, but this is taken from the National Venture Capital Data reported in the 
year 2003 and labeled briefly as "Domestic $US (1,000): total classic". We made an estimation to obtain data for venture capital 
investment in the year 2003. This estimation is based on classic VC investment growth rates from 2003 to 2004, published in the 
GEM 2005 Executive Report (Minniti, Bygrave and Autio, 2006, p. 49). 
3 In order to obtain a measure for our first education category (low), we summated the GEM education variables ‘none’ and ‘some 
secondary education’. The GEM variable ‘secondary education’ is used for our second education category (middle). Our third 
education category (high) is obtained by adding the GEM variables ‘post-secondary education’ and ‘graduate experience’.   12
interest rates are high, it is more expensive for firms to borrow from banks. This may lead to an 
increased demand for informal investment finance thereby raising the bargaining power of busi-
ness  angels.  This  is  especially  relevant  to  less  developed  entrepreneurial  financial  markets 
where leveraged start-up finance is rare and where loan and equity finance are more likely to be 




Besides these control variables we also include continents of country dummies and year dum-
mies. The continents of country dummies correct for structural differences between different 
parts of the world, while the year dummies control for worldwide business cycle effects (on top 
of the country-specific gdp growth variable).
5 
 
3.5 Descriptive Statistics 
To get more insight into the characteristics of informal investors, we first pay attention to some 
descriptive statistics. We distinguish between higher and lower developed countries, based on 
the World Bank classification of countries.
6 This divides into  17 relatively  lower developed 
countries and 28 relatively higher developed countries. The higher developed countries are fur-
ther organised by  their  level of  entrepreneurial activity  with an opportunity  motive (GEM’s 
‘opportunity TEA’ index). For each country the average opportunity TEA index over the avail-
able years is computed. Within the group of higher developed countries there is a natural split 
between two  groups  of countries  where the  average level of opportunity  entrepreneurship is 
above or below 6.5%.  Table 1 provides an overview of the country classification in terms of 
economic development level and opportunity TEA. We also present the continent of each coun-
try.  
 
4 In particular, we use a variable labeled “interest rate, banks prime lending, per cent per annum, period average”. 
5 Because we have a discrete left-hand side variable, we cannot include too many discrete variables on the right-hand side. In order 
to limit the number of discrete variables on the right-hand side, we use continent of country dummies instead of regular country 
dummies (note that all micro variables on the right-hand side are also of a discrete nature). The four macro level variables in our 
model, together with the continent of country dummies, should capture the bulk of the macro level variation in the data though. 
6 Specifically, the lower developed countries include the countries categorised by the World Bank as “low-income economies,” “lower-middle-
income economies,” or “upper-middle-income economies,” while the higher developed countries correspond to “high-income economies.”   13
 
Table 1. Country classification used in this paper 
Country  Continent  Low or high economic 
development level 
Opportunity TEA high 
or low 
Argentina  South America  Low  - 
Brazil  South America  Low  - 
Chile  South America  Low  - 
China  Asia  Low  - 
China (Shenzhen)  Asia  Low  - 
Croatia  Europe  Low  - 
Ecuador  South America  Low  - 
India  Asia  Low  - 
Jordan  Asia  Low  - 
Mexico  South America  Low  - 
Peru  South America  Low  - 
Poland  Europe  Low  - 
Russia  Asia  Low  - 
South Africa  Africa  Low  - 
Thailand  Asia  Low  - 
Uganda  Africa  Low  - 
Venezuela  South America  Low  - 
Belgium  Europe  High  TEA low 
Denmark  Europe  High  TEA low 
Finland  Europe  High  TEA low 
France  Europe  High  TEA low 
Germany  Europe  High  TEA low 
Greece  Europe  High  TEA low 
Hong Kong  Asia  High  TEA low 
Hungary  Europe  High  TEA low 
Israel  Asia  High  TEA low 
Italy  Europe  High  TEA low 
Japan  Asia  High  TEA low 
Netherlands  Europe  High  TEA low 
Portugal  Europe  High  TEA low 
Singapore  Asia  High  TEA low 
Slovenia  Europe  High  TEA low 
Spain  Europe  High  TEA low 
Sweden  Europe  High  TEA low 
Switzerland  Europe  High  TEA low 
Taiwan  Asia  High  TEA low 
United Kingdom  Europe  High  TEA low 
Australia  Australia  High  TEA high 
Canada  North America  High  TEA high 
Iceland  Europe  High  TEA high 
Ireland  Europe  High  TEA high 
Korea  Asia  High  TEA high 
New Zealand  Australia  High  TEA high 
Norway  Europe  High  TEA high 
United States  North America  High  TEA high 
 
We will now discuss some country characteristics of the business angel populations. 
   14
Number of informal investors 
A cross-country comparison of the percentages of informal investors in the sample shows that 
the variation is quite large. Figure 1 shows the percentage of informal investors per country for 
each subset of countries. It follows from this figure that with a minimum percentage of 0.27, 
Croatia has the smallest share of informal investors among all countries. To the contrary, both 
Uganda (13.44%) and Jordan (13.44%) have the largest number of informal investors. It is re-
markable  that  the  top-5  countries  having  the  largest  percentages  of  informal  investors  (i.e. 
Uganda, Jordan, Peru, China (Shenzhen), and Ecuador) are developing countries only. A possi-
ble reason for this is that in these countries the venture capital industry will be very small and 
underdeveloped (perhaps lacking the legal, political and financial industry infrastructure to sup-
port VC formal investment funds) and so  informal investment  becomes  the  main  manner in 
which investors secure equity in new ventures. Also, in such countries, entrepreneurs are more 
inclined to borrow money from friends and family due to the culture. Entrepreneurs in devel-
oped countries can often more easily utilize own capital, bank loans and/or formal investments. 
On average, the percentage of informal investors is higher in poor countries as compared to rich 
countries.  
 
   15
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Source: GEM Adult Population Survey 
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Amount invested per informal investor 
As far as the amount of informal investment is concerned, 73.5% of all informal investors in-
vested an amount of at most US$ 20,000, while 25.5% provided an informal investment of be-
tween US$ 20,000 and US$ 1,000,000. Business angel investments of more that US$ 1,000,000 
are quite uncommon (1.0%). More detailed information regarding the amount of informal in-
vestment in subsets of countries is presented in Table 2. It follows from this table that, on aver-
age, informal investors in rich countries invest a relatively higher amount of money than infor-
mal investors in poor countries.  
 
To summarize, in rich countries there are less informal investors who invest more on average, 
while in poor countries there are more informal investors who invest less on average. 
 
Table 2. Amount of informal entrepreneurial investment in US$ (percentage distribution) 
High developed countries 
Invested amount (US$)  TEA High  TEA Low 
Low developed 
countries  All countries 
1 – 99  10.8  2.9  19.9  9.3 
100 – 999  8.7  6.4  33.6  14.5 
1,000 - 4,999  18.7  19.3  27.8  21.5 
5,000 - 19,999  31.1  35.1  13.2  28.1 
20,000 - 59,999  18.1  23.4  2.9  16.6 
60,000 - 999,999  11.4  12.1  1.5  9.0 
at least 1,000,000  1.1  0.8  1.1  1.0 
    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0 
Note: The amount of business angel investment is available for 7,027 of the total of 8,554 informal in-
vestors. 
Source: GEM Adult Population Survey 
 
 
Relationship to investee 
Figures 2a and 2b show the relationship of the business angel to the person that received their 
personal investment (i.e. the investee) per country. Averaged over all countries, it holds that 
45.8% of the informal investors invested in a firm of a close family member, and 28.3% in a 
business of a friend or neighbour. Investing in firms of a work colleague (8.2%), of another 
relative (9.4%) or in a firm of ‘a stranger with a good business idea’ (8.3%) occurs significantly 
less often. When taking a closer look at the relationship of the informal investor to the investee 
across countries, we see that the differences (across poor and rich countries) are quite large. In 
some countries people are reticent towards investments in firms of a stranger (e.g. Hong Kong, 
Hungary, Russia and Venezuela), while this mode of business angel investment is more com-
mon for some other countries (e.g. Switzerland and Germany). On average, informal investors 
in poor countries are more likely to invest in firms of family or friends and less likely to invest 
in the firm of a stranger, compared to rich countries.    17
 
Figure 2a. Relationship of business angel to investee, highly developed countries  
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Source: GEM Adult Population Survey   18
 
Figure 2b. Relationship of business angel to investee, low developed countries 
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Source: GEM Adult Population Survey 
 
 
Sector of investment 
Table 3 provides an overview of the distribution of informal investors over the sector of eco-
nomic activity of the investee firm (based on the OECD sector classification): Taking a look at 
the distribution of informal investors among the firm’s sector of economic activity in which 
they invested it can be seen that 31.2% of all informal investors invested in a firm in the sector 
retail trade, restaurants and hotels. Firms in business services get 16.8% of the business angel 
investments, followed by 9.5% in firms in the sector wholesale, motor vehicle sales, and repair. 
Other sectors achieve less informal investment. Regarding the sector of the investee, there are 
relatively large differences between informal investors in rich countries and informal investors 
in poor countries. About half of all informal investors in poor countries invest in the sector re-
tail, hotels and restaurants, while less than a quarter invests in this sector in rich countries. In 
these countries, informal investors invest relatively more in business services.   19
 
 
Table 3. Sectoral distribution of informal investors (in percentages). 
High developed countries 
Firm type of investee  TEA High  TEA Low 
Low developed 
countries  All countries 
Agriculture/Hunting/Forestry/Fishing  8.0  4.9  5.1  5.6 
Mining/Construction  8.8  7.1  3.2  6.2 
Manufacturing  9.2  8.3  8.5  8.6 
Transportation/Communication/Utilities  7.3  6.0  5.9  6.2 
Wholesale/Motor Vehicle Sales/Repair  8.8  9.4  10.2  9.5 
Retail/Hotels/Restaurants  20.3  24.4  49.4  31.2 
Financing/Insurance/Real Estate  5.7  6.2  2.4  4.9 
Business Services  20.9  21.2  7.2  16.8 
Health/Education/Social Services  4.7  6.1  3.2  4.9 
Consumer Services  6.4  6.3  5.1  6.0 
    100.0    100.0    100.0    100.0 
Note: The sector of the investee firm is available for 8,105 of the total of 8,554 informal investors. 
Source: GEM Adult Population Survey 
 
 
Demographic characteristics of informal investors 
We now take a closer look at the demographic characteristics of informal investors. Figure 3 
shows that the business angel rate is higher for men than for women. We also see that informal 
investors are overrepresented in the age categories between 25 and 44 years. It can be seen from 
Figure 4 that, in general, female informal investors are much more reticent than males regarding 
investments in firms of people other than close family members. To the contrary, males are in-
clined to invest more often in firms of a work colleague, a friend/neighbour or a ‘stranger with a 
good business idea’, especially in rich countries.  
 
We also compare the relationship of the informal investor to the investee among all age catego-
ries. This reveals that informal investors aged 55-64 and 65 or older are most likely to invest in 
firms of a close family member (54.0% and 63.8% resp.). In addition, informal investors that 
are most likely to invest in firms of a stranger are in the age category 55-64 (11.0%), 45-54 
years (10.2%), or 65 or older (9.3%). By contrast, informal investors with an age between 18 
and 44 years are most likely to invest in firms of a friend or neighbour, a work colleague or an-
other relative. Thus, while individuals between 25 and 44 years of age are more likely to be an 
informal investor, those of age of 45 years or higher are more likely to invest in firms of a close 
family member or of a stranger. See Figure 4.   20
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Figure 4. Relationship of business angel to investee, by gender and age (all countries) 
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4. Research approach 
As  we  have  seen informal investors in highly  and  lowly  developed countries  have different 
characteristics. Informal investors in lowly developed countries are more numerous but they in-
vest less on average. Furthermore, they are less inclined to invest in a firm of a stranger, com-
pared to informal investors in higher developed countries. They also invest in different sectors. 
Because of these differences it is not unlikely that the determinants of business angel prevalence 
are also different, hence estimation of an econometric model should be performed separately for 
samples of high and low developed countries. Unfortunately, the number of observations for the 
less developed countries is too small, due to missing observations (in particular for certain con-  21
trol variables). Therefore we focus on the more highly developed countries. Of the 364,843 ob-
servations for all 45 countries, 299,284 observations belong to the 28 higher developed coun-
tries (see Table 1). Among this number there are 6,369 informal investors (2.1%). The number 
of observations in the estimation samples is smaller however, due to missing data for several of 
the micro and macro variables. In particular, of the countries listed in Table 1, data for one or 
more of the macro-economic variables are missing for Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan and Portugal 
so that these four countries are not included at all in the estimation samples. Our estimation 
sample includes 175,162 valid observations, 136,178 (38,984) of which belong to countries with 
a low (high) opportunity TEA rate. These observations are distributed over 24 countries. 
 
We estimate a multinomial logit model explaining the prevalence of (pure) business angels in-
vesting in a firm of a stranger, and the prevalence of informal investors investing in a firm of a 
friend or family member
7, relative to the base category of not being an informal investor. The 
models are estimated for the whole sample (all highly developed countries) as well as for sam-
ples of static and dynamic countries (i.e. countries with a relatively low and high level of oppor-
tunity-based entrepreneurship) separately. Finally we also estimate a logit model focusing on 





5. Estimation results 
Table 4 presents the results of a multinomial logit model using data for all highly developed 
countries in our data base (see Table 1). It follows from the highly significant and positive pa-
rameter estimates for the first six micro-level variables that people who are/have been involved in 
entrepreneurship in any form – whether currently running a business, currently trying to start a 
business, planning to start a business in the near future, recently having shut down a business, 
etcetera – have a higher probability of being an informal investor. These results are broadly in line 
with hypotheses 3 and 4, but they do not – with the exception of the entrepreneurial skills variable – 
support hypothesis 1. Concerning the variable ‘have you recently shut down your own business’, the 
estimated coefficients are in line with hypothesis 4 (entrepreneurial capital accumulation school of 
thought), but not with hypothesis 3 (HRM-Labor economics school of thought).   Thus, from an eco-
nomic performance perspective, entrepreneurial activity whether ongoing or having resulted in exit 
appears to boost the supply of informal investors.  
 
Concerning the TEA opportunity rate, we find a significantly positive effect for the TEA oppor-
tunity rate for the probability of being a 3 FFF investor but we do not find an effect on the 
probability of being a pure business angel. Hence, hypothesis 2a is partially supported. The ef-
fect for VCI per capita is not significant. However, in line with hypothesis 2b, we will see later, 
the distinction between high and low entrepreneurially active markets is necessary to separate 
out potential offsetting effects in order for this variable to show its true effects.   
 
Furthermore, when focusing on the demographic characteristics of informal investors, males are more 
likely to be a business angel than females as the effect of gender (1=male, 2=female) is negative. As 
far as the age of a business angels is concerned, it seems that older people have a significant larger 
probability of informally investing in a firm of a stranger than people in the youngest age cate-
 
7 This class is an aggregate of the four categories ‘close family member’, ‘some other relative, kin or blood relation’, ‘work col-
league’ and ‘friend or neighbor’, as identified in the GEM survey. 
8 For this estimation we also control for sector of investment . Note that this is not possible in the normal business angel preva-
lence regressions, because individuals who are no business angel –by definition– have no sector to invest in.   22
gory (the base category). We also see that higher educated individuals are more likely to be informal 
investors. 
 
Focusing on the controls at the macro level, it can be seen from Table 4 that per capita income posi-
tively affects the probability of being a business angel. Citizens in relatively higher income developed 
countries are more likely to be an informal investor than citizens in lower income developed coun-
tries. The effect of a country’s interest rate on the decision to invest informally is somewhat remark-
able. It turns out that a higher interest rate increases the probability of being an informal investor. A 
possible explanation for this is a substitution effect between loan and equity finance.  A higher cost of 
borrowing increases the appeal of equity finance and hence raises the demand for informal finance.  
This also increases the bargaining power of business angels and the 3 FFFs when dealing with entre-
preneurs. Economic growth seems to have no impact on the probability of investing in a firm of a 
friend or family member, but a negative impact on the probability of investing in a firm of a stranger. 
This is a little puzzling and may be due to a competition effect associated with good alternative in-
vestment opportunities in the corporate sector (financial markets), the housing market and other mar-
kets where returns are positively related to economic growth.  
 
 
INSERT TABLE 4 
 
 
Results for the micro level determinants in Tables 5a and 5b are in line with the results found in Table 
4 – they are all significantly positive. Hence, the broad support for hypotheses 3 and 4 over hypothesis 
1 are valid independent of the type of market – high or low levels of opportunity entrepreneurial activ-
ity. The results also provide much support for hypothesis 2b as the most remarkable difference be-
tween Tables 5a and 5b is that for markets with low levels of entrepreneurial activity, the effect of 
VCI per capita on the probability of being a business angel is much weaker compared to the effect for 
markets with higher levels of entrepreneurship. The coefficient of VCI for informal investment in the 
category 3 FFFs is non-significant for low opportunity TEA markets and positive and highly signifi-
cant for high opportunity TEA markets. As regards the coefficient for more pure business angel inves-
tors, the coefficient for high opportunity TEA is more than twice as high as the coefficient for low op-
portunity TEA markets (15.5 versus 6.8). In line with hypothesis 2b these results appear to indicate 
that the degree to which VC and informal investment activities are complements (as opposed to substi-
tutes) is positively related to the level of entrepreneurial activity in the market. 
 
 
INSERT TABLE 5A AND 5B 
 
 
Table 6 focuses on the mode of informal investment. For the subsample of informal investors 
we investigate what determines the choice for investment in a firm of a friend or family member 
(3 FFF) or (business angel) investment in the firm of a stranger. We see that of the entrepre-
neurship-related variables only one has a significant impact so that in general the factors that 
promote 3 FFF informal investment also promote business angel informal investment.  How-
ever, one difference is that people who are currently the owner/manager of a business, have a 
higher probability of investing in a firm of a stranger. In other words, given that they are also 
informal investors, people who actually run a business are more likely to be pure business an-
gels compared to 3 FFFs investors.   This may be due to both supply and demand factors.  If any 
of friends and family are involved in the current business then there are less opportunities for 3 
FFF investment.  Correspondingly, if substantial entrepreneurial capital accumulation has oc-
curred in the current business then the entrepreneur may be encouraged to invest in more ambi-  23
tious projects and hence drawn more formally into business angel style investment in businesses 
owned by strangers.  Again, the results seem to reject hypothesis 1 in favor of hypothesis 4. 
 
In Table 6 we also see that, in markets with low opportunity TEA, women are less likely to be busi-
ness angels. Instead they are more likely to invest in a firm of a friend or family member (3 FFFs). For 
high opportunity TEA markets this gender effect is not significant. For low opportunity TEA markets 
we also see that older investors are more likely to invest in the firm of a stranger. 
 
High educated people have a larger probability of being an informal investor relative to people 
with a low level of education (see Tables 5a and 5b), and this effect applies to both informal in-
vestment of the 3 FFF and pure business angel variety, but they do not have a preference with 
respect to their investment in a firm of family/friends or that of a stranger (see Table 6).  
 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 
 
 
Overall, at the micro level we find that if an individual is involved in entrepreneurial activity, 
this has a positive effect on the probability of this individual becoming an informal investor.  
We find this effect broadly carries for both the 3 FFFs and more pure business angel investment 
types.  These results do not support the classical notion of individuals being constrained in their 
choice by limited endowments of time and money.  By contrast the results lend strongest sup-
port to entrepreneurial capital accumulation school of thought which indicates that entrepreneu-
rial activity helps individuals to accumulate (as opposed to exhaust as the classical school pre-
dicts) skills and resources necessary for informal investment activity.  In terms of macro vari-
ables the results indicate that higher levels of entrepreneurial activity have a positive effect by 
encouraging more people to become informal investors (most likely by creating a supply of in-
vestment opportunities for informal investors).  This lends support for the Keynesian hypothesis 
that an increase in the demand for informal investment (as a result of increased entrepreneurial 
activity) will generate its own supply (of informal investors).  We also find support for an indi-
rect macro effect where higher levels of entrepreneurial activity increase the extent to which 
VCs and informal investors/business angels operate as complements rather than substitutes.  In 
sum, the results indicate that concern over market failure associated with an enterprise equity 
gap may be overstated as we uncover dynamic relationships which help ameliorate this problem.  
We unearth a virtuous circle relationship between entrepreneurship and informal investment ac-
tivity which appears to indicate that natural market forces will ensure that entrepreneurial activ-
ity and the number of informal investors seeking to invest in these businesses work positively in 
tandem with one another – thereby reducing scope for market failure of the type associated with 




Informal investors (including business angels and the 3 FFFs – friends, fools and family) pro-
vide venture finance to entrepreneurs in a key area often associated with equity gaps – namely, 
early stage finance that is either too risky, too early stage and/or too small an amount of money 
to fit the profile of investments normally sought by venture capitalists.  This investment is fre-
quently informal, undocumented and hence far less researched than venture capital.  In this pa-
per we sought to shed more light on what determines the supply of business angels and hence a 
key type of finance necessary for entrepreneurs.   
   24
We investigated the impact of both macro and individual level factors determining the probabil-
ity that an individual will become an informal investor.  At the level of the individual we iden-
tify four schools of thought and associated hypotheses indicating how past, present and future 
entrepreneurial activity is likely to influence the probability of a person becoming a business 
angel.  The results indicate that in general for most individuals these activities are complemen-
tary rather than competing.  Our results indicate that the attributes of successful business angels 
– namely, wealth (finance to invest), entrepreneurial management skills (helping ventures with 
innovation and entrepreneurial strategy as well as small business management), reputation (in 
order  to  attract  other  co-investors  and  other  resource  providers  to  back  target  invest-
ments/ventures) and the ability to spot profit opportunities (either based on past success or from 
the lessons learnt from failure, i.e. the ‘school of hard knocks’)  -  can be fostered by the learn-
ing by doing, wealth creation and reputation enhancement when one is involved in entrepre-
neurship.  We argue that if these effects are sufficiently strong then, notwithstanding the pres-
ence of time and wealth constraints, they lead to a net positive effect on the supply of business 
angels. 
 
Our second strand of investigation relates to the impact of macro influences where we argue 
that a high level of entrepreneurial activity is likely to generate sufficient critical mass (includ-
ing clusters, networks and knowledge spillovers) to generate increasing returns to scale in terms 
of the availability of new venture investment opportunities.  The same conditions draw forth a 
more optimal scale and integrated venture finance industry i.e. with established exit paths for 
business angels including venture capital investment and co-exits with venture capitalists. Since 
business angel and 3 FFF investment is very early stage (in fact the earliest stage of external 
equity finance) the existence of later stage venture capital and associated exit routes can in-
crease both the growth and liquidity potential of business angel investment. Therefore, we hy-
pothesise that countries with higher levels of entrepreneurial activity are likely to have greater 
availability  of  follow  on  venture  capital  finance  and  exit  opportunities.  This  makes  venture 
capital and informal investors operate as complements rather than substitutes. Therefore, we 
hypothesise that a positive relationship between venture capitalists and business angels may ex-
ist and that this is stronger in more entrepreneurially active economies. 
 
The evidence supported this perspective.  We find a substantial positive effect of the extent of 
the formal venture capital (VC) market on the probability of becoming an informal investor for 
dynamic economies with high levels of entrepreneurial activity, but a much smaller impact for 
static (low entrepreneurial activity) economies. This is consistent with our view that in highly 
active entrepreneurial economies more individuals are willing to engage in informal investment 
because the presence of an established VC industry provides follow on investment (potential 
exit and/or boost firm growth/value) as well as opportunities to exit using the same routes and 
occasions as venture capitalists.  In other words, business angels/3 FFFs and venture capitalists 
work as complements on a well developed and integrated venture finance supply chain.  By con-
trast, in economies with low levels of entrepreneurial activity, there are less investment oppor-
tunities so that venture capitalists and business angels are more likely to find themselves in 
competition more often.  This outcome is also likely to be exacerbated by the fact that a less de-
veloped venture finance industry in countries with lower levels of entrepreneurial activity is 
likely to mean a less developed and integrated venture finance supply chain.  In sum, in less en-
trepreneurially active economies the formal and informal venture capital markets appear to act 
as substitutes while in dynamic more highly entrepreneurial economies they appear to operate as 
complements.  
 
Overall, the results provide a richer picture of the determinants of the supply of a crucial form 
of finance in any entrepreneurial economy. The results uncover a positive virtuous circle where 
the demand for business angel finance tends to generate its own supply as a result of micro and 
macro factors.  This appears to indicate that short term equity gaps – caused by excess demand 
for venture finance by entrepreneurs – may to some degree be ameliorated automatically by 
natural market forces. However, we also find that higher levels of entrepreneurial activity in-  25
crease the probability that venture capital and business angel finance work in tandem with one 
another  as complements  rather than substitutes. Overall, the  results  uncover some important 
new relationships that perhaps provide some good news that market forces to some extent ap-
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Table 4. Parameter estimates of a multinomial logit model for highly developed countries 
Model      : Multinomial Logit 
Dependent variable   
  Category 0  : No business angel (base category) 
  Category 1  : Business angel in firm friend/family 
  Category 2  : Business angel in firm stranger 
Method     : Maximum Likelihood 
Effective sample  : 175,162 observations 
 
  Business angel investing in 
firm of friend/family 
  Business angel investing in 
firm of stranger 
  Coefficient  Std. error    Coefficient  Std. error 
Regressors              
  intercept  -5.702***  0.233    -7.856***  0.699 
  you  are  currently  the  owner/ 
manager of a business  0.554***  0.040 
 
1.227***  0.105 
  you are currently trying to start 
a new business  0.316***  0.050 
 
0.323**  0.130 
  you expect to start a new busi-
ness within the next 3 years  0.669***  0.043 
 
0.774***  0.116 
  you are currently trying to start 
a  new  business  – on  behalf 
of your employer  0.653***  0.060 
 
0.621***  0.149 
  you  recently  shut  down  your 
own business  1.050***  0.057 
 
0.977***  0.153 
  you have the skills required to 
start a new business  0.776***  0.040 
 
0.722***  0.131 
Macro level           
  TEA opportunity rate  0.053***  0.017    0.014  0.052 
  VCI per capita (x 1000)  0.207  0.746    3.505  2.362 
           
Controls           
Micro level           
  Gender (1=male, 2=female)  -0.242***  0.036    -0.636***  0.113 
  Age           
     18-24 yrs (base category)           
     25-34 yrs  -0.197***  0.064    0.149  0.212 
     35-44 yrs  -0.063  0.062    0.204  0.205 
     45-54 yrs  -0.136**  0.064    0.236  0.210 
     55-64 yrs  0.000  0.067    0.449**  0.213 
     ≥ 65yrs  0.106  0.073    0.335  0.243 
  Education           
     low (base category)           
     middle  0.093*  0.048    -0.342**  0.144 
     high  0.354***  0.047    0.436***  0.131 
Macro level           
  gdp per capita (x 1000)  0.016**  0.007    0.047*  0.024 
  gdp growth  0.022  0.014    -0.226***  0.045 
  interest rate  0.083***  0.010    0.077***  0.027 
Note: * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. 
Year and continent of country dummies included but not reported. 
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Table 5a. Parameter estimates of a multinomial logit model for highly developed countries with a 
low opportunity TEA (i.e. static markets) 
Model      : Multinomial Logit 
Dependent variable   
  Category 0  : No business angel (base category) 
  Category 1  : Business angel in firm friend/family 
  Category 2  : Business angel in firm stranger 
Method     : Maximum Likelihood 
Effective sample  : 136,178 observations 
 
  Business angel investing in 
firm of friend/family 
  Business angel investing in 
firm of stranger 
  Coefficient  Std. error    Coefficient  Std. error 
Regressors             
  intercept  -5.706***  0.425    -10.718***  2.262 
  you  are  currently  the  owner/ 
manager of a business 
0.526***  0.051    1.252***  0.133 
  you  are  currently  trying  to 
start a new business 
0.390***  0.068    0.377**  0.165 
  you  expect  to  start  a  new 
business  within  the  next  3 
years 
0.698***  0.056    0.957***  0.145 
  you  are  currently  trying  to 
start  a  new  business  –  on 
behalf of your employer 
0.837***  0.082    0.647***  0.192 
  you  recently  shut  down  your 
own business 
1.096***  0.074    1.154***  0.186 
  you have the skills required to 
start a new business 
0.811***  0.049    0.713***  0.160 
Macro level           
  VCI per capita (x 1000)  -1.129  0.863    6.789**  3.015 
           
Controls           
Micro level           
  Gender (1=male, 2=female)  -0.231***  0.044    -0.736***  0.141 
  Age           
     18-24 yrs (base category)           
     25-34 yrs  -0.069  0.081    0.374  0.271 
     35-44 yrs  0.021  0.078    0.458*  0.264 
     45-54 yrs  -0.019  0.082    0.374  0.273 
     55-64 yrs  0.087  0.084    0.616**  0.276 
     ≥ 65yrs  0.171*  0.093    0.454  0.315 
  Education           
     low (base category)           
     middle  0.042  0.056    -0.162  0.164 
     high  0.314***  0.056    0.359**  0.158 
Macro level           
  gdp per capita (x 1000)  0.019  0.012    0.119*  0.063 
  gdp growth  0.010  0.019    -0.312***  0.077 
  interest rate  0.099***  0.014    0.202***  0.059 
Note: * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. 
Year and continent of country dummies included but not reported. 
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Table 5b. Parameter estimates of a multinomial logit model for highly developed countries with a 
high opportunity TEA (i.e. dynamic markets). 
Model      : Multinomial Logit 
Dependent variable   
  Category 0  : No business angel (base category) 
  Category 1  : Business angel in firm friend/family 
  Category 2  : Business angel in firm stranger 
Method     : Maximum Likelihood 
Effective sample  : 38,984 observations 
 
  Business angel investing in 
firm of friend/family 
  Business angel investing in 
firm of stranger 
  Coefficient  Std. error    Coefficient  Std. error 
Regressors               
  intercept  -6.033***  0.653    -6.084***  1.965 
  you  are  currently  the  owner/ 
manager of a business  0.604***  0.064 
 
1.179***  0.183 
  you  are  currently  trying  to 
start a new business  0.185**  0.075 
 
0.116  0.230 
  you  expect  to  start  a  new 
business  within  the  next  3 
years  0.645***  0.068 
 
0.514**  0.204 
  you  are  currently  trying  to 
start  a  new  business  –  on 
behalf of your employer  0.451***  0.088 
 
0.526**  0.251 
  you  recently  shut  down  your 
own business  1.008***  0.089 
 
0.731**  0.289 
  you have the skills required to 
start a new business  0.724***  0.072 
 
0.690***  0.242 
Macro level           
  VCI per capita (x 1000)  10.922***  2.167    15.494**  6.192 
           
Controls            
Micro level            
  Gender (1=male, 2=female)  -0.241***  0.060    -0.459**  0.201 
  Age            
     18-24 yrs (base category)            
     25-34 yrs  -0.413***  0.108    -0.155  0.354 
     35-44 yrs  -0.216**  0.101    -0.200  0.346 
     45-54 yrs  -0.346***  0.104    0.051  0.345 
     55-64 yrs  -0.167  0.111    0.223  0.351 
     ≥ 65yrs  -0.065  0.118    0.128  0.399 
  Education            
     low (base category)            
     middle  0.220**  0.096    -0.516  0.341 
     high  0.433***  0.089    0.617**  0.267 
Macro level            
  gdp per capita (x 1000)  0.009  0.014    -0.043  0.046 
  gdp growth  0.136***  0.042    0.106  0.138 
  interest rate  0.118***  0.027    0.121  0.080 
Note: * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. 
Year and continent of country dummies included but not reported. 
   31
 
Table 6. Parameter estimates of a binomial Logit model within the group of business angels for 
highly developed countries, high and low opportunity TEA markets  
Model      : Binomial Logit 
Dependent variable   
  Category 0  : Business angel in firm friend/family (base category) 
  Category 1  : Business angel in firm stranger 
Method     : Maximum Likelihood 
Effective sample  : 2,638 observations (low TEA)       1,510 observations (high TEA)  
 
  Countries with a low oppor-
tunity TEA (static) 
  Countries with a high  oppor-
tunity TEA (dynamic) 
  Coefficient  Std. error    Coefficient  Std. error 
Regressors               
  intercept  -7.146***  2.004    0.290  2.113 
  you  are  currently  the  owner/ 
manager of a business 
0.777***  0.143    0.572***  0.191 
  you  are  currently  trying  to 
start a new business 
0.018  0.185    -0.024  0.231 
  you expect to start a new busi-
ness within the next 3 years 
0.224  0.160    -0.167  0.211 
  you  are  currently  trying  to 
start  a  new  business  –  on 
behalf of your employer 
-0.147  0.220    0.007  0.259 
  you  recently  shut  down  your 
own business 
0.155  0.204    -0.164  0.284 
  you have the skills required to 
start a new business 
-0.016  0.162    -0.026  0.237 
Macro level           
  VCI per capita (x 1000)  6.894**  2.970    3.781  6.474 
           
Controls             
Micro level             
  Gender (1=male, 2=female)  -0.525***  0.149    -0.189  0.193 
  Age             
     18-24 yrs (base category)             
     25-34 yrs  0.453  0.282    0.305  0.359 
     35-44 yrs  0.410  0.275    0.038  0.347 
     45-54 yrs  0.470*  0.285    0.437  0.344 
     55-64 yrs  0.608**  0.287    0.424  0.359 
     ≥ 65yrs  0.211  0.323    0.148  0.402 
  Education             
     low (base category)             
     middle  -0.187  0.177    -0.751**  0.328 
     high  0.045  0.168    0.106  0.268 
Macro level             
  gdp per capita (x 1000)  0.150***  0.057    -0.056  0.045 
  gdp growth  -0.194**  0.079    -0.061  0.136 
  interest rate  0.161***  0.056    -0.010  0.084 
Note: * Significant at 10% level; ** Significant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level. 
Sector, year and continent of country dummies included but not reported. 
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